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How Should Taxes Be Set? 
S. Rao Aiyagari 
Senior Economist 
Research Department 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Are current U.S. budget deficits too high? Is a balanced 
budget amendment to the U.S. Constitution a good 
idea? After all, most state governments are required to 
balance their budgets over a two-year period. Why not 
insist that the federal budget also be balanced over 
some suitably short period of time, if not year by year?
1 
Should exceptions be made in the event of a war? For 
instance, would the United States have been better off 
raising taxes immediately to pay for the Vietnam War 
instead of financing it by running up the federal debt 
(as was done)? How should tax policy respond if the 
government anticipates entering a medium-term war in 
the near future? 
All of these questions have a common feature: They 
force us to confront the issue of how taxes should be set 
given the usually fluctuating, and often unpredictable, 
requirements for government expenditures.
2 The pur-
pose of this article is to explain the principle of tax 
setting and budget management and use this principle 
in a specific model to try to answer the above questions. 
The point of view I will adopt here is that of a benev-
olent federal government which has the welfare of its 
citizens as its prime consideration and which properly 
takes account of the impact of taxes on incentives and 
welfare. I will also assume that the path of government 
expenditures over time is given exogenously. That is, 
the choice of the level and composition of government 
expenditures is not of concern here. 
The general tax-setting principle that I will explain 
and illustrate is the following: The path of tax rates over 
time should be such as to produce a constant path of the 
marginal welfare cost of taxation, that is, to equalize 
the marginal welfare cost of taxation at different times. 
The marginal welfare cost of taxation is the loss in 
consumer welfare due to an extra dollar's worth of taxes 
over and above the extra taxes raised. Such a loss is 
always incurred when taxes are not lump sum.
3 The 
above principle emerges as the best way to minimize 
the present value of the welfare cost of taxation or, 
equivalently, to maximize consumer welfare. 
1 State governments maintain separate accounts for current and capital 
spending and are required to balance the budget on current account only; they 
are permitted to borrow for capital spending. The federal government does not 
have separate current and capital accounts. 
2 By government expenditures I mean (throughout) net of interest expendi-
tures, that is, government purchases of goods and services plus transfer 
payments. 
3 A lump-sum tax is a tax that is not related to any economic decision. It is a 
head tax that specifies the total amount of tax to be paid regardless of what the 
individual does. Those familiar with the literature on market imperfections may 
be surprised to read that non-lump-sum taxes lead to losses in consumer 
welfare; for often ad valorem taxes and subsidies are recommended to correct 
such losses, due to externalities (pollution, for example) and monopolies. My 
concern here is with raising tax revenues to meet exogenously specified 
government expenditures and not with using taxes and subsidies to correct for 
market imperfections. I will, therefore, assume that there are no market 
imperfections other than those caused by the government's need to raise 
revenues. 
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A Preview 
Applying the general principle leads, in some instances, 
to two more specific conclusions. 
One is that taxes at any date should depend on the 
permanent level of government expenditures plus inter-
est on government debt from that date onward. The 
permanent level of government expenditures is defined 
as that constant level of expenditures (from now till 
forever) which has the same present value as the actual 
stream of expenditures (from now till forever). It repre-
sents an average value of the stream of current and 
future government expenditures and is equivalent to an 
annuity value. This concept is borrowed from Milton 
Friedman's (1957) concept of permanent income which 
he used to explain the relationship between consump-
tion and income.
4 In particular, this conclusion implies 
that, even if actual government expenditures fluctuate, 
taxes should not change as long as the permanent level 
of government expenditures plus interest on debt does 
not change. This is analogous to Friedman's theory that 
consumption is proportional to permanent income. 
The other conclusion that arises is that, in some 
instances, the time path of taxes should fluctuate less 
(that is, be smoother) than that of government expen-
ditures.
5 This results from the simple fact that the 
stream of annuity values associated with a given stream 
of government expenditures will generally fluctuate 
much less than the expenditure stream. As an example, 
suppose that government expenditures are alternating 
between $100 and $200 year after year while the 
interest rate is constant at 10 percent. Then the perma-
nent value of government expenditures will alternate 
between $147.62 and $152.38 year after year.
6 The 
reasoning behind this conclusion is again similar to that 
behind Friedman's theory of consumption. Friedman 
argued that consumers typically prefer to avoid highly 
fluctuating patterns of consumption (feasts followed by 
fasts); they want to maintain as smooth a pattern of 
consumption as possible. Therefore, consumers will 
typically borrow (or use up savings) when income is low 
and repay the debt (or replenish savings) when income 
is high. 
This second conclusion implies that it may be 
entirely appropriate to finance unusually high (that is, 
higher than average) expenditures by issuing debt 
(borrowing) rather than raising tax rates and to use the 
surpluses (savings) in periods of below-average ex-
penditures to retire some of the debt. In this way, high 
expenditures would be allowed to result in deficits and 
debt accumulation which would be offset by surpluses 
and debt retirement in periods of low expenditures so 
that tax rates could be held steady. 
It follows that a constitutional amendment to bal-
ance the budget over short horizons may not be such a 
good idea. This would be the equivalent of a consumer 
feasting when income is high and fasting when it is low. 
The question of whether current deficits are too high 
cannot be answered definitively since it depends on a 
judgement regarding future government expenditures. 
Current government expenditures may or may not be 
judged as being unusually higher than average future 
government expenditures. If so, current deficits may not 
be too high and could be offset by future surpluses when 
expenditures dip below average. But if not, current 
deficits may be too high and present tax policy inappro-
priate. Different readers may be inclined toward dif-
ferent conclusions. 
We can push the analogy between the tax-setting 
problem and the permanent income theory of consump-
tion a little further. Friedman's theory also implies that 
if consumers experience an unexpected windfall in 
income (for example, a lottery win), then they will not 
consume the entire windfall immediately. Instead, they 
will only consume the annuity value of the windfall 
and will save the rest for the future. Thus, consumption 
increases by the amount of the increase in permanent 
income, but by much less than the actual windfall 
in income. Similarly, if current government expen-
ditures are much higher than expected (with no change 
in future government expenditures), tax rates should 
probably be raised so that revenues increase roughly by 
4Robert Barro's text (1984, chap. 4, p. 92) provides a simple exposition of 
the concept. Chaipat Sahasakul (1986) uses this concept for an empirical study 
of U.S. taxation. 
5 The government budget constraint which will be developed later requires 
that the discounted present value of tax revenues be sufficient to finance the 
discounted present value of expenditures plus interest payments on government 
debt. In this present value sense, the government budget is always balanced. 
Further, the average level of tax revenues must be equal to the average level of 
expenditures plus interest on debt. The question of how tax rates should be set is 
about the appropriate time path of tax rates given the present value or, 
equivalently, the average level of tax revenues. The pioneering work in this area 
is by Frank Ramsey (1927). 
6Readers may verify that a constant stream of expenditures of $ 147.62 has 
the same present value as an alternating stream of $100 and $200. Similarly, a 
constant stream of $ 152.38 has the same present value as an alternating stream 
of $200 and $ 100. If r is the interest rate and gt is government expenditures in 
period t, then the formula for the present value at time t (PVt) is 
PVt = gt + lft+1 /(1 + r)] + [gt+2/( 1 + r)
2 ] + [gt+3/( 1+r)3] +.... 
Then the permanent value of government expenditures at time t (gt) is 
g, = [r/(l+r)](PV,). 
23 the amount of the increase in permanent government 
expenditures, but by much less than the actual increase 
in government expenditures. The permanent income 
theory of consumption also implies that if consumers 
expect a permanent increase in income (that is, an 
increase in every period) of, say, $ 1, then permanent 
income increases $1 and, hence, so does consumption. 
Similarly, if government expenditures are expected to 
increase permanently, then tax rates should probably 
increase, too, so that tax revenues increase by about the 
same amount. 
I will illustrate the general principle of tax setting, as 
well as the above more specific conclusions, using a 
relatively simple model of tax determination and debt 
policy developed by Robert Barro in 1979. First I will 
describe Barro's model. Then I will explain how and 
why the model leads to the conclusions outlined above. 
And then I will note some of the model's limitations and 
discuss how they qualify its conclusions. 
A Simple Model of Tax Setting 
The Barro model treats the private sector as consisting 
of a single, representative, infinitely lived consumer/ 
worker. Models of this type have been found to be very 
useful to study a variety of issues in economics, includ-
ing consumption theory (Christiano 1987), business 
fluctuations (Kydland and Prescott 1982, Prescott 
1986), investment theory (Sargent 1986), and long-run 
growth (Romer 1986). While this type of model seems 
highly abstract, under certain conditions it can be 
shown to have properties identical to those of models 
which seem more realistic, that is, have a variety of 
consumers constantly being born and dying (Aiyagari 
1987). 
As for taxation, I will assume that the government 
cannot levy lump-sum taxes. This certainly seems very 
realistic. Because of this assumption, taxes will gen-
erally be related to the level at which people choose to 
undertake various economic activities and so will af-
fect their incentives in making consumption and work 
decisions. Consider the effects of an income tax, for 
instance. An income tax will generally affect people's 
incentives to work (since the after-tax income from a 
second job may not be worth the loss in leisure, for 
example) and to save (since interest income is also 
taxed). There can also be more subtle intertemporal 
effects. If people know, for example, that the tax rate 
will be much higher next year than it is this year, then 
they will have a great incentive to increase work this 
year (and postpone the unpaid vacation to next year) 
and to decrease saving. The converse will be true if the 
tax rate is expected to be much lower next year. 
To get a feel for the importance of the incentive 
effects of a non-lump-sum tax, consider the following 
scenario. Suppose that government expenditures are 
fluctuating in a regular and predictable way. What 
would be the effects of raising and lowering the income 
tax rate in step with expenditures in order to maintain a 
balanced budget? Clearly, this would create incentives 
for people to work less and therefore produce less in 
periods when expenditures are high. We will see that, on 
average, this leads to a lower level of output and, hence, 
private consumption (total output less government 
expenditures less investment). A policy of maintaining 
the tax rate roughly constant clearly would not create 
similar incentives to shift work intertemporally and so 
would lead to a higher average level of private consump-
tion. Thus, the intertemporal incentive effects of fluc-
tuating tax rates can imply a smooth time path of tax 
rates (relative to government expenditures) as being 
best from a social point of view. 
I now describe the model more fully: 
• This economy has one infinitely lived agent who 
works and produces a good which may be either 
consumed or stored for future consumption. Work 
(measured in, say, hours per week) involves an 
opportunity cost measured in units of foregone 
consumption, and the agent cares for net consump-
tion, that is, consumption net of the opportunity 
cost of working. Storage of the good yields a con-
stant net return equal to r. 
• The path of government expenditures over time is 
given exogenously, and taxes are proportional to 
labor income.
7 The government may also issue 
debt to meet expenditures. 
• The individual agent maximizes welfare given by 
the discounted sum of the utility of net consump-
tion by choosing the allocation of work, net con-
sumption, and saving over time and taking the time 
path of tax rates as given. 
• The government chooses the time path of tax rates 
to maximize the agent's welfare subject to its own 
budget constraint, taking account of the effects of 
changing tax rates on the agent's behavior. The 
7The assumptions that taxes are proportional (rather than progressive or 
regressive) and levied only on labor income, not on capital income, simplifies 
the exposition considerably. Permitting capital taxation leads to some interest-
ing complications which I will touch on later. Note that implicit in my assump-
tion is another, that interest income on government debt is not taxed either. 
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government also treats the time path of expen-
ditures exogenously. 
The Consumer/Worker 
Let C(0, Kt) be consumption and work (labor), respec-
tively, in period ty where t takes values 0,1,2, Let 
//(/) denote the opportunity cost of work in units of 
foregone consumption, and let 
(1) c(t) = C(t)-H(l(t)) 
denote net consumption. A fairly typical opportunity 
cost function, //(•), is shown in Figure 1. The marginal 
opportunity cost of work is defined as the increase in 
opportunity cost resulting from a one-unit increase in 
work and corresponds to the slope of the curve //(•) in 
Figure 1. Assume that both the opportunity cost and the 
marginal opportunity cost are zero at zero work and 
that both are increasing as the level of work increases. 
This means that both the level of work and the marginal 
unit of work are costless at zero work and both become 
increasingly unpleasant as work increases. Next assume 
that each unit of work results in w units of output,
8 and 
denote by y (t) net labor income, that is, labor income net 
of the opportunity cost of work as well as taxes. This is 
given by the following, where d(t) is the tax rate on labor 
income in period t: 
(2) y(t) = [ 1- 0(t)]wl(t) - H(l(t)). 
Tax revenues are denoted by T(t) and are obviously 
given by 
(3) T(t) = 6(t)wl(t). 
Let W(t) be the total wealth of the individual mea-
sured in units of consumption at the beginning of period 
t and consisting of K(t) units of capital and D(t) units of 
government debt. The individual earns interest on both 
of these at the constant rate r. We can now write the 
individual's intertemporal budget constraint this way: 
(4) c(t) + [W(t+1)/(1+ r)] = y(t) + W(t). 
Equation (4) says that net labor income plus wealth 
is either spent on net consumption or accumulated as 
future wealth. Note that since W(t+1) is wealth at the 
beginning of period t+1 in units of t+l consumption, 
its value in units of period t consumption is only 
W(t+l)/(l + r). Now assume that the individual maxi-
mizes welfare as of period 0, denoted by V(0), which is 
given by 
(5) V(0) = o J8'£/(c(f)). 
In this expression, U{•) measures the utility derived 
in period t and depends on period t net consumption,
9 
while P is the discount factor assumed to be positive but 
less than one. This implies that a unit of utility derived 
tomorrow is less valuable (by the factor /?) than a unit 
of utility derived today; that is, as a consumer, the 
individual is impatient with regard to the future. 
In order to analyze the consumer's welfare maximi-
zation problem, it will be convenient to rewrite the 
budget constraint (4) in present value form. To do this, 
assume that r is positive and wealth is bounded below; 
that is, wealth is always greater than some (possibly 
negative) number. Under these conditions, the con-




(6) 2~0c(0/(l+r)< = S^oWO/a+r)'] + W( 0). 
The consumer maximizes V(0) given by (5) subject 
to (6) by choosing the time paths of net consumption 
and net income. Note that from equation (2) net income 
is determined by the choice of work and will depend on 
the tax rate, 0(0. 
The solution to the problem of choosing the time 
path of work simply amounts to choosing lit) in each 
8 For now, take labor productivity to be constant over time in order to focus 
on the relationship between the time paths of government expenditures and tax 
rates. Note that with labor productivity fixed, the time paths of total tax 
revenues and tax rates will be similar. This need not be true when labor 
productivity also fluctuates over time. I will comment later on the effect this 
may have on tax setting. 
9This formulation of preferences is equivalent to one in which utility 
depends both on consumption, C(f), and on work, /(f), in the following special 
way: Utility = U[C(t) — //(/(f))]. This specification implies that the income 
effect on work is zero, which simplifies the exposition considerably. I am also 
implicitly assuming that government purchases of goods and services do not 
enter the consumer's welfare. This is only a simplification and makes no 
difference to the subsequent analysis since the path of government purchases is 
treated as exogenous. 
10Since wealth consists of capital (which is nonnegative) plus government 
debt (which may be negative; that is, the agent may be borrowing from the 
government), the restriction that wealth be bounded below amounts to 
prohibiting the agent from engaging in Ponzi games in which the agent borrows 
to finance consumption and keeps borrowing more and more to pay off 
previous debt without ever redeeming any debt. The present value budget 
constraint may be obtained by solving equation (4) for W(0) by repeatedly 
substituting for future values of wealth. I am implicitly assuming that transfer 
payments from the government are zero; otherwise they would have to be 
entered on the right side of (4). However, this makes no difference to the 
subsequent analysis since, again, transfer payments are treated as exogenous. 
25 period to maximize net income, yit). As is clear from 
equation (6), this results in the maximum possible 
present value of net income and, hence, also of welfare, 
V(0). This happens because any net consumption path 
that is feasible for the individual for a particular value of 
total wealth [ W(0) plus the present value of net income] 
is also feasible for a higher value of total wealth. That is, 
the maximum welfare that the consumer can attain 
depends only on total wealth and is always increasing 
with it. Therefore, regardless of the particular form of 
the utility function, maximizing consumer welfare is 




The choice of lit) is illustrated in Figure 1. In this 
figure, the straight line OB with slope w represents the 
relationship between before-tax income and work; the 
straight line OA with slope w[ 1—0(0] represents the 
relationship between after-tax income and work; and, 
recall, the curve //(/) represents the opportunity cost of 
work. The marginal after-tax income is defined as the 
extra income after taxes that the individual gets by 
working an extra unit, and it corresponds to the slope of 
OA. For any value of lit), then, the vertical distance 
between OB and OA gives the tax revenues and the 
vertical distance between OA and //(/) gives net income 
[equations (3) and (2)]. The maximum value of net 
income occurs when the marginal after-tax income, 
w[ 1—0(0], equals the marginal opportunity cost of 
work, the slope of the curve Hil). In Figure 1, maximum 
net income occurs at lit). This completes the description 
of the consumer's behavior. 
The Welfare Cost of Taxation 
Now we can define the concept of excess burden, which 




 In Figure 1, the tax rate 0(0 results in a net 
income of yit) and tax revenues of Tit) as shown. If, 
however, the government could raise the same amount 
of tax revenues by levying a lump-sum tax, then net 




 This difference in net income when the tax is 
proportional and when it is lump sum (when both yield 
the same tax revenues) is said to be the excess burden of 
taxation on the consumer. 
Let us show that net income would indeed be higher 
under a lump-sum tax that raises the same tax revenues 
as a proportional labor income tax. Under a lump-sum 
tax, the marginal after-tax income is w since the 
amount of the tax is independent of work. In Figure 1, 
the line MN represents after-tax income under a lump-
sum tax and has the same slope as OB. As before, the 
Figure 1 
The Consumer's Choice: 
How Much to Work 
consumer chooses the amount of work so as to equate 
the marginal opportunity cost of work [the slope of 
Hil)] to the marginal after-tax income, which is equal to 
the slope of MN under a lump-sum tax. In Figure 1, the 
choice of work under a lump-sum tax is lit). Let y'(t) 
and EBit) be the net income and the excess burden, 
respectively, under a lump-sum tax. As can be seen 
from the figure, /'(0 is greater than lit) since the 
marginal opportunity cost of work is increasing. 
Further, y\t) is greater than yit) since NC equals MG 
iMNCG is a parallelogram). The difference between 
1
1
 This conclusion depends on the facts that the interest rate r is given by the 
return on capital independently of tax policy and that the tax rate (or the level of 
tax revenues) does not enter the utility function (/(•). What is critical in 
generating the latter feature is the fact that the consumer cares for consumption 
net of the opportunity cost of work; or, equivalently, the income effect on work 
is zero. If consumption and the opportunity cost of work enter the utility 
function in some other fashion, this will not be true. 
12Barro's (1979) analysis was in terms of this concept. See also that of 
Christophe Chamley (1985). 
13Then why doesn't the government use lump-sum taxes? One reason, of 
course, is that we have assumed it can't (except conceptually). More generally, 
though, this requires a deeper look at taxation than is possible here. 
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yit) and^'CO, EG, represents the excess burden. We then 
have 
(7) EB(t) = y\t) — yit) 
= [wl'it)-HU'it))-Tit)]-yit). 
The Government 
I will now describe the government's budget constraint 
and maximization problem. Let git) be government 
expenditures in period t, and recall that Dit) is the face 
value of government debt outstanding at the beginning 
of period t. Then the period t government budget con-
straint is given by 
(8) git) + Dit) = Tit) + [Dit+l)/il+r)l 
Equation (8) says that the government's expen-
ditures and debt must be paid off by tax revenues and 
additional borrowing. Note that since D(/ + l) is the 
face value of debt at the beginning of period r + 1, its 
market value as of period t is only Dit+1)/(1+ r). 
Now we can develop the resource constraint for this 
economy. First, using equation (3), substitute Tit) for 
6it)wlit) in (2) and then substitute the resulting expres-
sion for yit) in (4). In the resulting equation, substitute 
for cit) from (1) and for Tit) from (8), and then use the 
fact that Wit) = Kit) + Dit). This yields the following 
resource constraint: 
(9) Cit) + git) + [Kit+l)/il+ r)] = wlit) + Kit). 
Equation (9) can also be interpreted as the national 
income identity (C + G + / = K). Since Kit)/H+ r) is 
the capital at the end of period t — 1, we may interpret 
rKit)/i\+r) as the return on capital in period t and 
[Kit + l)—Kit)]/il+r) as gross investment, 7(0, 
in period t. By subtracting Kit)/i\+ r) from both sides 
of equation (9), we can see that (9) is equivalent to the 
national income identity (where gross income Y is the 
sum of wage income and the return on capital). 
Just as we rewrote the consumer's budget constraint 
in present value form [equation (6)], we can do the same 
for the government's. Assume that Dit) has some upper 
bound, so that, just as the individual is, the government 
is prohibited from running a Ponzi game, or perpetually 
rolling over debt (note 10). Then rewrite equation (8) by 
repeatedly substituting for Dit + 1) in terms of Dit +2) 
and so on: 
(10) 2~0[g(0/(l+ r)<] + DiO) = Z~=0Tit)/a+ ty. 
Equation (10) says that the present value of tax rev-
enues must be sufficient to pay for the present value 
of expenditures plus the debt outstanding at date 0. 
Another way to write this equation is this: 
(11) ofew + W>(0)/(1+ r)] - Tit)}/i 1+ r)< = 0. 
The term r£)(0)/(l + r) represents interest payments 
on debt. Therefore, equation (11) says that, in present 
value terms, the government's budget is always bal-
anced: The present value of deficits (total expenditures 
+ interest on debt — tax revenues) must be zero. 
Therefore, the government cannot run deficits forever. 
Indeed, it cannot run surpluses forever, either. Thus, 
periods of deficits must be followed by periods of 
surpluses, and in a present value sense they must cancel 
each other out. 
In fact, on average, the government deficit must be 
zero if the average levels of tax revenues and govern-
ment expenditures are defined as follows: 
(12) T = [r/il+r)] 2^7X0/(1+ r)< 
(13) g = [r/a+r)]2^0git)/il+ry 
(14) T = g + [rDi0)/il+r)]. 
Here T and g are the geometrically weighted averages 
of the time paths of tax revenues and government 
expenditures, respectively. The result that the average 
deficit is zero is a simple consequence of the govern-
ment budget constraint (11). T and g are also the per-
manent levels of tax revenues and expenditures, re-
spectively (as defined in note 6). Thus, in this weighted 
average sense, the budget is always balanced, even 
though during any period t} tax revenues Tit) may 
exceed or fall short of expenditures plus interest on 
debt. The average level of tax revenues is, thus, de-
termined by the average level of government expen-
ditures and the initial level of debt. 
The Best Time Path for Taxes 
The question that remains to be answered is, What is the 
best time path of tax revenues given the average value? 
Should tax revenues be fairly smooth over time, staying 
close to their average value? Or should they vary highly, 
up and down, perhaps in step with government expen-
ditures? 
Assume again, that the government chooses the time 
path of tax rates, Bit), subject to its budget constraint 
27 and taking account of its effect on the consumer's 
behavior in such a way as to maximize the consumer's 
welfare, V(0). As we have seen, this is equivalent to 
maximizing the present value of net income. It is also 
equivalent to minimizing the present value of the excess 
burden, EB(t), which, recall, measures the welfare cost 
of taxation on the consumer. To see this, rearrange 
equation (7) and rewrite it in present value terms: 
(15) X~=0ymi+r)<=oM'C)" #(/'«)]/( 1+r)< 
- 2~07(0/(l+r)' 
- X~=0EBmi+ry. 
Note that the choice of lit) is, in fact, independent of 
tax revenues. [It depends only on labor productivity, w, 
and the opportunity cost function //(•) ] Further, the 
present value of tax revenues is independent of the time 
path of tax revenues [from the government budget 
constraint (10)]. So maximizing the present value of 
net income by choosing the time path of tax rates is 
equivalent to minimizing the present value of the excess 
burden. Thus, the government's problem can be stated 
as one of minimizing the present value of the con-
sumer's welfare cost of taxation that results because 
taxes are proportional rather than lump sum. 
To analyze this problem, it is convenient to let the 
government choose tax revenues 7(0 directly and the 
tax rate 0(0 indirectly, since the government's budget 
constraint is written in terms of T(t). That is, the 
government picks the level of tax revenues and lets the 
tax rate be whatever it must be to raise that level. Now 
we obviously need to determine the relationship be-
tween tax revenues 7(0, the tax rate 0(0, and net 
income y(t). This can be obtained from Figure 1 by 
varying the tax rate 0(0 between zero and one, deter-
mining the consumer's choice of work at each tax rate, 
and using those values to calculate the amount of tax 
revenues and the net income. 
The result of this exercise is shown in Figure 2. The 
relationship between the tax rate 0(0 and tax revenues 
7(0 has an inverted U-shape because, when the tax rate 
is zero, tax revenues will also be zero and, when the tax 
rate is one, the consumer will choose zero work, so tax 
revenues will again be zero.
1
4
 Net income y(t\ however, 
will always decrease as the tax rate rises. We may as 
well restrict attention to tax rates below 0*, the rate that 
produces the maximum amount of tax revenues, be-
cause any revenue that can be raised by a rate above 0* 
can also be raised by a rate below it and leave the 
consumer with more income. Therefore, the govern-
ment will never choose a tax rate above 0*. 
Given this restriction, we see that (not surprisingly) 
there is a one-to-one, increasing relationship between 
tax revenues and the tax rate and a one-to-one, decreas-
ing relationship between tax revenues and net income. 
Therefore, we may as well let the government specify 
tax revenues T(t) and then calculate the corresponding 
value of net income y(t) from Figure 2. This relation-
ship is illustrated in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 also shows the relationship between tax 
revenues 7(0 and the consumer's excess burden EB(t). 
From equation (7), we can see that, since lit) is in-
dependent of tax revenues, y'(t) decreases one-to-one 
with 7(0. When tax revenues are zero, yXO equals y(J) 
because the tax rate is also zero. Therefore, y\t) always 
lies above y(t), and the vertical distance between the 
two at a given level of tax revenues measures the excess 
burden. EB(t) is always increasing in tax revenues 
because when tax revenues go up by $1, net income 
falls by at least that much. The slope of £B(0, then, is 
the marginal excess burden, or the increase in the excess 
burden on the consumer due to a $1 increase in tax 
revenues. Under reasonable assumptions, we can show 
that the marginal excess burden is always increasing in 
tax revenues, is zero at zero tax revenues, and is 
infinitely high at the value 7*, which is the maximum 
possible tax revenues. The shape of the EB(t) curve in 
Figure 3 reflects this description. 
Now the government chooses the time path of tax 
revenues 7(0 to minimize 
(16) S~0£B(7(0)/(l+r)' 
subject to the constraint 
(17) S~07(0/(l+r)< = [g(l+r)/r] + D(0). 
The expression in (16) explicitly shows the dependence 
of the excess burden on tax revenues that we saw in 
Figure 3. Equation (17) is simply equation (14) re-
written using (12). Since the time path of expenditures 
g(t) is given and the amount of government debt 
outstanding in period 0 is also given (by past budget 
policies), the right side of (17) is independent of tax 
rates. This emphasizes one of the conclusions we noted 
earlier, that taxes should depend on the permanent level 
14This is the famous Laffer curve relationship between the tax rate and tax 
revenues. 
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Figures 2 and 3 
The Government's Choices: 
Figure 2 How Much to Tax ... 
Figure 3 ... And Burden the Consumer 
of government expenditures plus interest payments on 
government debt. 
The solution to problem (16)—(17) is quite simple: 
Keep tax revenues constant at the level 7 forever. From 
(14), this means that tax rates should be such as to 
generate revenues which equal the permanent level of 
government expenditures plus the interest on govern-
ment debt. 
The explanation for this remarkable conclusion is 
also fairly simple. First we must see that the marginal 
excess burden must be the same in any two successive 
periods. For suppose the contrary, that the marginal 
excess burden in period t (say, 2 units) is greater than 
that in period t + \ (say, 1 unit). If the government 
reduces tax revenues in period t by 1 unit and increases 
them by 1 + r units in period t +1, then the government 
budget constraint (17) will still be satisfied. But the 
excess burden will go down by 2 units in period t and 
will go up by 1 + r units in period t + \. Hence, the 
present value of the excess burden will go down by 1 
unit. A similar argument can be made if the marginal 
excess burden in period t is less than that in period t +1. 
This proves that, unless the marginal excess burden is 
the same in every period, the present value of the excess 
burden cannot be at its lowest possible value. 
The conclusion that tax revenues Tit) must be the 
same in every period follows because, recall, the slope 
of the EB(t) curve in Figure 3 is, by assumption, always 
increasing in tax revenues. If tax revenues differ in any 
two periods, therefore, the marginal excess burden 
cannot be the same in those two periods. From (12), if 
tax revenues are constant over time, then that constant 
level must be T. It also follows that the tax rate must be 
the same in every period. This is because, from Figure 2, 




Applying the Model 
Now I will describe the implications of the above 
analysis for some of my opening questions. 
A Balanced Budget Amendment 
First, is a balanced budget amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution a good idea? The Barro model suggests 
that the answer is no. According to this model, tax rates 
15I should emphasize here that the conclusion that tax revenues must be the 
same in every period depends on the assumption that labor productivity, w, is 
constant over time. If w is, instead, changing over time, then the relationship 
between y(t) and T(t) shown in Figure 3 will also be changing over time, as will 
the relationship between EB(t) and T(t). Thus, a constant path of the marginal 
excess burden will lead to a fluctuating path of tax revenues over time. In 
general, the tax rate will also be changing over time. 
29 should be determined by the permanent level of govern-
ment expenditures and should be chosen so as to 
equalize the marginal welfare cost of taxation over 
time. Only by coincidence would this imply that tax 
revenues equal government expenditures plus interest 
on debt in every period. Therefore, it would not be a 
good idea to raise and lower tax rates in step with 
expenditures so as to maintain a balanced budget. If 
that were done, the incentive to vary work over time in 
response to the changing tax rates would lower con-
sumer welfare by raising the present value of the excess 
burden of taxation. Therefore, it is better to let the 
deficit rise in periods of above-average expenditures, by 
issuing more government debt, and pay off the debt 
with surpluses in periods of below-average expen-
ditures. 
Responses to Spending Increases 
How should tax policy respond if the government faces 
increases in expenditures, such as those required for a 
war or, perhaps, for cleanup of toxic nuclear wastes? To 
simplify this discussion, I will assume that initially the 
level of government expenditures is constant and that 
tax rates are chosen as Barro's model says they should 
be. Initially, therefore, expenditures plus interest on 
debt will also be constant and equal to tax revenues, and 
the budget will have been in balance in every period. 
Let's consider several alternative types of spending in-
creases. 
• An Immediate Permanent Increase 
Suppose that, starting in period 0, the level of govern-
ment expenditures increases permanently and uni-
formly by, say, one unit. From (13), we can see at once 
that permanent expenditures also increase by one unit. 
Therefore, tax revenues should be raised immediately 
and permanently by one unit. Note that this conclusion 
is independent of the assumption that the initial path of 
expenditures was constant and that, initially, the budget 
was always in balance. Therefore, what remains unaf-
fected under such a tax response is the time path of the 
deficit. 
• An Immediate Temporary Increase 
Now suppose that, starting in period 0, the level of 
expenditures increases temporarily (for a certain num-
ber of periods) by, say, one unit. From (13) again, we 
can see that permanent expenditures increase by less 
than one unit, and so tax revenues should increase 
immediately and permanently by the amount of the rise 
in permanent expenditures. This implies that the gov-
ernment will be running deficits during the time that 
expenditures are higher than usual and, hence, more 
and more debt will be issued. Once expenditures return 
to normal, tax revenues will exceed expenditures by just 
enough to meet interest payments on the higher level of 
debt. That is, the budget will be in balance and stay that 
way. 
• An Expected Temporary Increase 
Finally, suppose that, starting in some future period, 
expenditures are expected to increase for a certain 
number of periods before returning to the initial level. 
How should tax policy respond? 
A balanced budget rule says to do nothing until the 
periods in which expenditures actually increase and 
then to raise tax rates by the required amount to keep 
the budget in balance. Barro's model recommends a 
different policy. This is to raise tax rates immediately to 
a higher constant level to match the increase in 
permanent expenditures, thereby running budget sur-
pluses until the period in which expenditures actually 
increase. The surpluses should be used to make loans to 
the consumer and build up credit. Then the interest 
income from these loans plus tax revenues should be 
used to partly offset the higher level of expenditures, 
the rest being made up by issuing more debt. When 
expenditures return to normal, the level of debt will be 
higher than initially, but the budget will be in balance 
and stay that way. This happens because tax revenues 
go up uniformly in all periods and, hence, will be higher 
than the initial level of expenditures plus interest. 
As you can see, the appropriate pattern of tax 
response to expected government spending increases is 
pretty much the same regardless of how large the 
increase is or how long it is expected to last or how soon 
it occurs. What differs is the magnitude of the imme-
diate (and permanent) increase in tax revenues. This 
happens simply because the magnitude of the rise in 
permanent expenditures increases with the magnitude 
of the rise in expenditures, the number of periods for 
which it lasts, and the proximity of the rise in expendi-
tures. This is a simple result of the definition of per-
manent expenditures in (13). However, note that the 
magnitude of the increase in tax revenues is always less 
than that of an expected increase in expenditures. 
Qualifying the Conclusions 
I have described a very simple model of tax determina-
tion and debt management and obtained some interest-
ing conclusions. Now I will highlight my simplifying 
assumptions and consider whether the model's results 
are affected if these assumptions are relaxed. 
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Robustness of Result 
My principal conclusion is that tax rates should depend 
on permanent government expenditures plus interest on 
debt. In particular, tax rates and tax revenues should 
move with current government expenditures only to the 
extent that such movements imply changes in perma-
nent government expenditures. The particular model 
that I used to illustrate these ideas led to a much 
stronger result—that tax rates and tax revenues should 
be constant over time. However, this result depends on a 
lot of special features in this model and will not 
necessarily hold for all others. These special features 
include, for example, the assumptions that labor produc-
tivity is constant, that utility depends only on the dif-
ference between consumption and the opportunity cost 
of work, and that the rate of return on capital is inde-
pendent of the amount of work. 
Commitment and Time Consistency 
The tax-setting problem has been formulated here as 
one in which the government chooses and announces 
at date 0 the entire infinite sequence of tax rates 
{0(0, f> 0}. But what if, once period 0 passes and 
period 1 arrives, the government does not remain 
committed to the announced time path of tax rates? 
What if it is allowed to choose a different time path 
from period 1 onward {0'(O, t> 1}? Would the model's 
conclusions be different? If the government is not 
committed to follow through with whatever tax rates it 
announces for future periods, how is the consumer 
supposed to form beliefs about future tax rates? 
Whenever the best choice of tax rates made in period 
t +1 for period t +1 and beyond differs from the best 
choice made in period t for period t +1 and beyond, 
there is said to be a problem of time consistency. 
Discussing this problem is beyond the scope of this 
article. Interested readers can consult papers by V. V. 
Chari (1988) and Chari, Patrick Kehoe, and Edward 
Prescott (1988). 
A lack of commitment by the government also leads 
to other problems. For instance, the government may 
default on its debt, having promised not to. It may 
promise not to tax capital, thereby encouraging saving 
and capital formation, and then levy a tax. Similarly, 
it may promise to pursue a low inflation policy, en-
couraging people to accumulate nominally denomi-
nated assets, and then engineer an inflation to tax away 
the real value of nominal assets. Chari and Kehoe 
(1988a,b) have analyzed the first two problems. In 
Aiyagari 1989,1 discuss these problems, at an elemen-
tary level, in more detail than I do here. 
In Conclusion 
In this article, I have considered the issue of how best to 
choose the time paths of tax rates and revenues and, 
hence, the time paths of government deficits and debt as 
well. This study was motivated by several real-world 
questions. To study this issue, I have presented a simple 
model of tax determination which was first analyzed by 
Barro in 1979. This model illustrates the general prin-
ciple that tax rates should be chosen to equalize the 
marginal welfare cost of taxation on the consumer 
across time periods. The model also suggests that tax 
rates and revenues should depend on the permanent 
level of government expenditures plus interest on debt, 
rather than fluctuating with the current level of govern-
ment expenditures, and that the paths of tax rates and 
revenues over time should be smoother than that of 
government expenditures. 
While the Barro model is conceptually useful, the 
applicability of its specific conclusions is subject to 
several qualifications. The development and analysis of 
more sophisticated models capable of studying how 
taxes should be set is today an active area of research in 
macroeconomics and public finance. 
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